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THE NOSTALGICS 
 
Tort law, we are told, is under threat. There was a time when people understood 
its deep structure, its underlying logic, what it was about. Those days are now 
gone. Nicholas McBride described the results of this change in near apocalyptic 
terms: ‘the study of tort law has undergone a . . . catastrophe at some point in the 
twentieth century, with the result that we no longer really understand what we 
are talking about when we talk about tort law.’1 Less ominously, others have also 
harked back to older times when tort law was better understood and complained 
how ‘we’, or at least ‘they’ (other academics, the courts), no longer understand 
the law. Ernest Weinrib wondered whether tort law ‘[has] a future’.2 John 
Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky waxed sentimental for that ‘domain of law that 
was born centuries ago with the recognition of the writ of trespass vi et armis’ and 
wondered ‘[h]ow is it that academics have lost their feel for this basic legal 
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category?’3 Robert Stevens admitted his views on tort law were ‘conservative’,4 
and challenged many ideas that dominated twentieth century tort law thinking. 
Allan Beever has been part of this chorus of nostalgics for quite some time. In 
a book published in 2007 he told his readers that the present problem with the 
law of negligence is that its ‘unity . . . has been forgotten’ and that we therefore 
have to ‘rediscover’ it.5 In his new book, he extends his argument in two ways: 
First, it is not just the unity of negligence law that’s been forgotten, but that of 
the entire private law; and it is not just the law that has been forgotten, but the 
entire form of justice that underlies it. We have come to think of the world 
exclusively through the lens of distributive justice, so that we no longer see that 
private law embodies a distinct form of justice, commutative justice. (Beever 
prefers ‘commutative’ to ‘corrective’ justice to highlight the fact that it is 
concerned not just with responses to wrongs, but with all interpersonal relations.) 
The source of all this is a philosophical confusion: the ‘traditional’ view he 
favours sees law (ie the natural law that exists pre-politically and that governs 
interpersonal relationship) as the foundation of political authority; the prevalent 
modern view reverses the relationship and sees all law as the product of 
politics (6). 
This may seem like a rather abstruse debate but Beever thinks it has significant 
real-world ramifications: ‘the modern conception leads us to misunderstand our 
law’ (273), it made us forget ‘what we ourselves know’ to be true (242); it has 
even ‘distorted our view of ourselves’ (309). As an aid to failing memory, the 
book presents a historical account that seeks to chart the path that has led to our 
  
present unhappy state. Beever takes his readers on a tour through the works of 
some of the best known names in the history of Western philosophy with the 
aim of demonstrating how what ‘we’ once knew has become unknown. The 
story follows the familiar arc of rise and fall, with the traditional view getting its 
first articulation in ancient Athens, developing slowly until it reaches its apex in 
the work of Immanuel Kant. By then, however, the forces of decline have 
already begun to wreak havoc, and by the time we get to the present the modern 
view ‘has become unconscious’ (2); so unconscious that Beever does not expect 
the traditional view to ‘make much sense to the reader, at least not until she has 
finished reading [the] book’ (1). Nevertheless, it is an effort worth making, 
because the stakes could not be higher. The dominance of the modern view is 
not just of theoretical concern, it has had a terrible practical effect on our lives: 
it has led us to rely on the state to such a degree that we may soon unwittingly 
be descending towards totalitarianism (291), caring too much about the 
community and not enough about individuals and ‘overemphasiz[ing] the 
importance of the state’ (309). 
These are very bold claims, but as I hope to show Beever does not provide 
anything remotely sufficient to substantiate them. The following three sections 
provide some of evidence to challenge Beever’s claims. The next section then 
shows the weakness of Beever’s more theoretical claims. The final section argues 
that contrary to Beever’s claims that the traditional view provides a non-political 
foundation for private law, Beever’s views have a clear political orientation. 
 
  
THE FORGETTING THESIS 
 
Beever’s main thesis is that there are two distinct forms of justice – 
commutative and distributive – and that we have forgotten about 
commutative justice, the form of justice that governs our interpersonal 
relationships. Consequently, we see all law from the perspective of 
distributive justice, the form of justice that governs our relation to the 
state. As a result ‘we do not understand the most basic features of our 
political or legal obligations to one another’ (1). Furthermore, this perspective 
is ‘by far the most fundamental’ (2) because it is only through these 
interpersonal relationship that states, politics, and distributive justice 
become possible. The heart of the problem is that contemporary writers 
on ‘social, political, or legal philosophy’ are ‘all but exclusively concerned 
with the state’ (1). What is missing is the perspective that involves people in 
relation to each other, regardless of the state. Much of the book then 
proceeds to contrast what Beever believes is the correct but forgotten 
‘traditional view’ with the prevailing but deeply flawed ‘modern view’. I 
will call this ‘the forgetting thesis’. 
Part of the difficulty in evaluating the forgetting thesis is that it is so 
fuzzily articulated. We are told that it is ‘we’ who have forgotten about 
commutative justice, but it is never made clear who ‘we’ are. Sometimes it 
seems that it is all of us who have forgotten it, so that ‘[w]hen we talk of 
public discourse, we talk almost as if we were creatures who relate to other 
  
individuals only via the state and its concerns’ (309). At other times, it 
seems that while ‘we’ the people actually still ‘think in terms [of the traditional 
view] routinely’ (241), ‘we’ the philosophers and academic lawyers have 
come to think in the wrong way (14–29, 255–257, 173, 276). However, even 
this claim is qualified when Beever admits that the view has not been 
‘entirely forgotten’ and then provides a long list (that could have been 
much longer) of prominent scholars who still follow the traditional view (8). 
At times Beever says that merely presenting his readers with ‘the political 
world through the eyes of the traditional theorists . . . is no small task’ because 
‘[t]he modern view places a veil over all our thought that is very hard to lift’ 
(6). Yet at other times Beever is confident that his readers will find ideas he 
associates with the modern view unintuitive (231) and even ‘too implausible 
to be taken seriously’ (4, n 3). There are times when we are told that ‘the 
fundamental structure of the private law remains based on commutative 
justice’ (273), but elsewhere we are told that the single-minded pursuit of the 
impartiality of commutative justice ‘is what the common law looked like’ 
once, but that ‘it does not look like that now’ (306). In some places ‘casual’ 
reflection directs us immediately to the ‘obvious’ traditional analysis (252), 
while at other times, we are told that the ‘language of the street’, presumably 
the casual language of the layperson, ‘is the language of the modern 
conception’ (246, 252). 
Even ignoring these ambiguities, can we say that anything like the forgetting 
thesis is true? The answer is unequivocally negative; in fact, as a historical 
  
matter quite the opposite is the case. Underlying Beever’s thinking is a view that 
‘insists on treating individuals as such rather than merely as elements in the 
collective’,6 and he sees the modern view, because it obliterates interpersonal 
relationships, as of a piece with this collectivist approach. As it happens, historical 
and anthropological research strongly suggest that this individualistic ethical 
stance is a relative historical novelty that appeared in the world of ideas at the 
same historical period Beever associates with the rise of the modern view.7 In 
historical terms, then, Beever gets things exactly backwards. 
When turning from history to contemporary reality, the view that individuals 
have certain obligations to each other regardless of politics or citizenship is utterly 
familiar. We live in a world saturated with social norms that no-one thinks of as 
related to the state: they range from relatively trivial matters like dress codes or 
the appropriate manner of addressing strangers, through matters that are on the 
borderline of morality like the appropriate way to behave towards one’s 
neighbours or in a foreign country, to outright moral questions like the 
obligations we have towards the elderly, friends, the care for one’s family and 
relatives and so on. It would also be wrong to think that these views are 
acknowledged by most people but ignored by ivory tower academics. Moral 
realism is a controversial (although by no means unheard of ) metaethical 
position, and it is standardly understood to be the view that one’s basic moral 
obligations are universal and exist irrespective of the political unit one finds 
oneself in. Even without commitment to this view, virtually all the work in 
normative ethics is dedicated to exploring interpersonal obligations. It is for this 
  
reason that philosophers draw a distinction between moral and political 
philosophy, the former dealing with people’s obligations to each other, the 
latter with the relationship to the state. As Beever cites titles of books on political 
philosophy as proof of our forgetting (195), it is perhaps worth mentioning that 
what is probably the most widely discussed book in moral philosophy of the last 
two decades is entitled What We Owe to Each Other.8 
Beever, of course, knows all this. He mentions the view that ‘[p]olitical and 
legal obligations emanate in some way from the state or society, but moral 
obligations are or can be independent thereof’ (3). To overcome this obvious 
response to his claim, a response he considers ‘wrong’ (3), Beever gerrymanders 
the appropriate domain for his inquiry as the ‘politico-legal’ (11), a term that he 
invents. He then discovers, unsurprisingly, that he cannot find find 
contemporary philosophy on interpersonal relationships. That does not show 
that people have forgotten their obligations to each other, only that Beever 
has excluded their views on such relations by definitional fiat. Even if we 
are ultimately convinced his classification of such relations as ‘politico-
legal’ rather than ‘moral’ is superior, that does not show that such 
interpersonal norms have been forgotten. 
I doubt, however, whether Beever’s novel classification is superior. Beever 
suggests two ways of distinguishing politico-legal norms from ‘mere moral’ ones. 
At one point he says that ‘morality is focused on individuals as such’ (3) rather 
than their relations with others. That is, to put it gently, a rather unusual 
definition of morality as it excludes virtually everything that most people talk 
  
about when they talk of morality. To get a sense of how peculiar this definition 
is, it leads Beever to say that ‘it would be odd to think that [the reason I should 
not hit my wife] was moral rather than political’ (4), which I am confident is the 
exact opposite of how most people would think about the matter. 
At a different point Beever offers a more functional distinction between the 
two kinds of norms, in that ‘only [politico-legal] norms justify coercion’ (31, 
also 20). This claim, as far as I can tell, is indirectly related to the claim that 
politico-legal norms are concerned with the right, while mere moral ones are 
concerned with ‘the good’ and with ‘moral worth’ (31). This claim has the 
curious implication that Beever’s politico-legal norms are, as a conceptual 
matter, tied to the state, because as a conceptual matter they justify coercion. 
This is not true of the view of modern thinkers for whom the question of which 
norms are the business of the state is itself a normative question (with some 
thinking that promoting the good is the business of states, others rejecting this 
view). Even if we put the entire domain of ‘mere morality’ to one side, Beever’s 
thesis still bears no relation to reality. Though he has some reservations about the 
term, Beever clearly aligns himself with natural law theory (eg, 9–10, 123–125). 
If what has been forgotten is some version of natural law, then the forgotten 
thesis is false. A quick and unscientific search for English-language books with 
the term ‘natural law’ in their title published since the year 2000 returned dozens 
of such books.9 This is not to say that natural law theories have not changed 
through the ages or that there are no important differences among them. The 
point is that at the level of abstraction at which Beever addresses these issues, the 
  
ideas he talks about are a familiar part of the discourse. 
The picture does not change when we consider Beever’s more specific theses. 
Beever’s main claim in political philosophy is that (natural law) norms of 
interpersonal relations are the basis for politics; his main thesis in legal theory is 
that these pre-political norms form the foundations of private law. Beever 
presents the first thesis as something that most of his readers will find utterly 
baffling, indeed barely comprehensible. As we have all been looking at the world 
through ‘the modern theorist’s glasses’, ‘we have as yet no idea what the world 
would look like without them’. Once we took them off we would be able to see 
‘vistas few today imagine’ (33). If by ‘us’ Beever refers to the general public, he 
may be right, because the questions he is interested in belong to a rarefied 
academic debate that most people do not bother themselves with one way or the 
other. But if we consider the target audience of this charge, that of political 
philosophers, the supposedly forgotten view that bases the justification of 
political institutions on interpersonal moral foundations is entirely familiar, 
and not just among those who see themselves as working within the natural 
law tradition.10 
The same is true of Beever’s claims regarding private law. Charles Fried’s 
Contract as Promise, a book that argues that one can explain almost all of contract 
law in terms of promissory relations that exist between individuals outside the 
state, is not exactly an obscure book. In it, Fried rejects the view that justifies 
contract law for its ability to promote ‘a distinct collective policy, the furtherance 
of economic exchange’.11 Fried argues instead that contract is based on the 
  
binding force of an exchange of promises, which he thinks is ‘grounded not in 
arguments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust’.12 Nor 
is Fried’s the only attempt to explain contracts in terms of promises or other 
interpersonal relations. The same goes for tort law, where just in the last few 
years we have seen works with titles such as Torts and Rights and ‘Torts as 
Wrongs’ which espouse the supposedly forgotten view. Beever may have some 
disagreement over particulars with any of these scholars, but the key components 
of such views are exactly those he claims are now virtually forgotten. And while 
these views are by no means universally accepted, they are familiar and widely 
discussed. Similar views have also been popular in criminal law. Despite the 
prominence of the state in the present-day criminal justice system (as prosecutor, 
adjudicator, and enforcer), much of the resurgence of retributive theories of 
punishment has been attributed exactly to the view that sees criminal law as 
concerned with wrongs committed towards others (cf 87–88) and which sees 
criminal law’s underlying theory as belonging to moral, not political, philosophy. 
Here too, the ideas in question are controversial, but the suggestion that they are 
somehow forgotten is absurd.13 
Nor are such ideas merely the domain of academic debate. Some of the most 
discussed ideas in the moral theory of our day have counterparts in social activism 
and political reform. Global justice, universal human rights, and concern for 
animal welfare (to name but a few) are all theoretical ideas with real-world 
counterparts, all largely based on the idea that people have obligations to others 
outside the state. Contrary to Beever’s claims, one of the distinctive marks of the 
  
modern age is what Peter Singer called ‘the expanding circle’, the broadening 
of the domain of obligation people think they owe to others (including 
non-humans) despite not having any relation (personal, familial, or national) to 
them.14 To an unprecedented degree, ours is the age in which people have 
concerned themselves, without any mediation by the state, with the lives of 
strangers. 
 
MISTAKEN HISTORY 
 
As mentioned at the outset, Beever seeks to bolster his claim about our present 
forgetting of commutative justice with a historical narrative. As the claim 
underlying the history is false, it is no surprise that the narrative aiming to show 
how we got here cannot support it. It would take more space than I have here 
to demonstrate just how inaccurately Beever presents the theorists he considers. 
Suffice it to say that whenever I checked the views Beever attributed to a 
philosopher against what that philosopher actually wrote, I found major 
discrepancies.15 I limit myself here to the person Beever claims has made the 
single most significant contribution to the displacement of the traditional 
view, Thomas Hobbes. 
According to Beever, the English Civil War ‘had an enormous effect on 
[Hobbes’s] thought . . . [which] helps us explain the form of Hobbes’ theory’ 
(175) (never mind that Hobbes first expressed his ideas in The Elements of Law, 
which was written before the Civil War erupted). Beever explains that 
  
Hobbes became convinced that ‘the ultimate cause of the English Civil War 
was the idea of a higher law’ (179) (never mind that in Hobbes’s book on the 
Civil War, which Beever does not mention, it is not ‘the idea of a higher law’ 
that troubled Hobbes, but that of divided authority to determine what the 
higher law means).16 According to Beever the effect of Hobbes’s ideas was 
destructive. They ‘blinded us to more accurate views of [the political and legal 
world]’ and ‘we have become so accustomed to our partial sight, that it is only 
with great effort and after much squinting that we are able to open our eyes’ 
(195). 
This claim is very difficult to square with Beever’s own reading of Hobbes’s 
work. Beever argues that Hobbes ‘rejects the tradition without any justification 
at all’ (202); not only that, despite his efforts to depart from the traditional view, 
‘Hobbes [was] committed to the existence of commutative justice and to the 
notion that it grounds all politico-legal obligation’ (201–202). So according to 
Beever himself, Hobbes does not give any reason for departing from the 
traditional view, and then does not actually depart from it! If this is so, it is not 
clear why Hobbes should have been so ‘influential’ (202). The errors Beever 
attributes to Hobbes are not matters discovered only after close analysis of 
Hobbes’s arguments (something Beever never attempts to do); these are glaring 
blunders of a philosophical novice. Put slightly differently, if, as Beever suggests, 
Hobbes relied on the traditional view he supposedly repudiated, how did he 
‘ma[k]e people see the world in a different way’ (195)? Even supposing we 
moderns cannot see those errors as our vision has become so clouded, 
  
Hobbes’s contemporaries, at the time not yet exposed to the modern view, 
should have spotted them immediately. On Beever’s retelling, rather than 
being an epoch-making figure, Hobbes should have been a minor figure in the 
history of thought, rarely read and remembered only by a few historians.17 
Furthermore, Beever’s story does not match the historical record. After his 
death Hobbes was often known as ‘the Monster of Malmesbury’, someone 
whose books contained dangerous heresies, not an influential figure whose ideas 
were embraced. It is therefore difficult to see the historical basis for Beever’s 
claim that by the time Locke published his Two Treatises of Government the 
traditional view in England had already ‘collapse[d]’ (224) to such a degree that 
Locke could no longer even talk of commutative justice. Indeed, even today 
when Hobbes is widely read and often admired, he remains in many respects a 
notorious thinker. No matter how ‘influential’ he has been, Hobbes’s readers 
have retained their critical faculties to such a degree that they have been able to 
reject what Hobbes must have considered his most important conclusion – the 
necessity of an unbounded political authority for the sake of social stability. 
Another problem with Beever’s account is that even after Hobbes (and 
Bentham, and Rawls) ‘we’ have not stopped reading others. One of the most 
puzzling aspects of the forgetting thesis is that the thinkers Beever hails as the 
beacons of Truth are among the best known thinkers in history, philosophers 
whose place in the canon of Western philosophy could not be more secure. His 
list of traditionalists includes Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant, who are still read, 
debated, analysed, taught, as well as criticised. No matter how ‘influential’ 
  
Hobbes has been, the suggestion that the ideas of Beever’s traditionalists have 
been forgotten is indefensible. 
 
MISSING HISTORY 
 
So far I have discussed what is in Beever’s book, but it is worth spending some 
time on what is not; what, if you wish, Beever has forgotten. One of the striking 
features of Forgotten Justice is the limited extent to which the thinkers discussed in 
it are placed in their historical context. To the extent that they are, the only 
history Beever deems relevant is the history of kings and queens, of war and 
peace (37–38, 61–62, 90–91, 95–98, 175–178, 207–208).18 This leads to some 
rather odd historical claims, as when Beever claims that Aquinas, Pufendorf, and 
Kant were all ‘heavily influenced by the Holy Roman Empire’ (96). What is 
completely missing (rather surprisingly, in a book that aims to highlight the 
importance of interpersonal relationships beyond the state) is social, cultural, and 
technological history. So we read about the Glorious Revolution (208) but not 
a word about the industrial revolution, despite the latter’s much greater impact 
on the shape of present-day private law; we read about the French revolution 
(203) but not about the scientific revolution, despite the fact that one cannot 
understand modernists like Hobbes or Bentham without taking into account the 
way they, explicitly and consciously, have sought to extend the methods of 
natural science to human affairs. 
One gets only the briefest of hints from Beever’s book of the fact that the 
  
modern states in the developed world are different beasts from those that existed 
in the times of Locke, Kant, or even Mill (to say nothing of Aristotle or Cicero). 
Beever only acknowledges this at one point when he says that Aquinas, 
Pufendorf, and even Kant lived at a time in which ‘the centrality of the state . . . 
would have seemed highly questionable, if not strange’ (98), but he does not 
draw from this the conclusion, that at least as a descriptive matter it is the modern 
view that corresponds to present-day political reality. Consequently, it is not 
‘modern theorists [who] have adopted an understanding of the political and the 
legal that is fundamentally wrong’ (1), but traditionalists like him who claim we 
would get a better grasp of the politico-legal reality of our time by reading works 
written by people living in, and writing against the background of, an entirely 
different political environment. 
Because Beever is not alone among contemporary traditionalists in ignoring 
this broader historical context, it is worth relaying it in slightly greater detail. In 
the supposed glory days of respect for interpersonal relationships, when the state 
and distributive justice were (at best) only a remote presence in most people’s 
lives, what one finds is not so much respect for interpersonal relationships, but 
levels of interpersonal violence dramatically higher than those found in 
developed countries today. To this day, non-state societies have average 
homicide rates that are orders of magnitude higher than those found in state 
societies; and the same is true of Western societies in the pre-modern age. For 
instance, the homicide rate in fourteenth century Oxford was more than a 
hundred times higher than the homicide rate in contemporary London.19 In 
  
today’s western countries, where the state is most prominent, women – 
more than half the world’s population – enjoy more ‘interpersonal 
independence’ (292) than they have had at any point in recorded history.20 
Many attribute these dramatic changes, at least in part, to the rise of the 
modern state.21 Though it is difficult to be certain about causality on such 
matters, at the very least the data suggest that individuals’ concern for 
interpersonal relations alone may not be powerful enough to guarantee 
people’s safety from others. They also undermine the suggestion that 
because of an ever-present Leviathan we have collectively forgotten about 
interpersonal relations. 
It is also worth remembering that although the state is in some respects a more 
prominent feature in our lives these days, it is much less so in others. Jeremy 
Bentham, a modernist according to Beever, was among the first to call for 
decriminalising sexual ‘irregularities’ in the name ‘all comprehensive freedom’. 
Immanuel Kant, probably Beever’s foremost traditionalist, believed that it is the 
state’s business to punish these violations of natural law.22 Here is what Bentham 
had to say of the idea of criminalising certain sexual practices: ‘If there is one idea 
more ridiculous than another, it is that of a legislator who, when a man and a 
woman are agreed about a business of this sort, thrusts himself in between them, 
examining situations, regulating times and prescribing modes and postures’.23 
Beever’s account makes it hard to understand why such words sound so obvious 
to modern ears. 
The history of scientific and technological development is also forgotten in 
  
the works of the nostalgics. Beever manages to write a book tracking the 
historical development of contemporary ideas on private law without 
mentioning the fact that these days (but not in the days of Locke or Kant) most 
adults in many parts of the world are in charge of machines that can cause death 
or serious injury to others, not because of forgetfulness of the importance of 
interpersonal relationship, but due to a moment’s carelessness. Those who 
lament the supposedly skewed contemporary vision of tort law as ‘accident-
law-plus’,24 forget that it reflects modern-day reality: much less interpersonal 
violence than in the olden days of assault and battery, but many more accidents. 
Even limiting ourselves to the world of ideas, Beever forgets that we live in 
the world of risk and probability, theoretical concepts largely unknown before 
the eighteenth century, but now so prevalent we no longer notice their ubiquity. 
The development of notions of risk is not just the product of mathematical 
advances, but also due to the wealth of statistical data that makes risk assessments 
possible. (The word ‘statistics’ bears witness to this science’s historical connection 
to the rise of the state.) The methodical collection of such data, though it had 
some predecessors, began in earnest only in the nineteenth century.25 
Consequently, in its modern sense ‘risk’, contrary to Cardozo’s famous words in 
Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad, is not ‘a term of relation’26 but one of pooling 
different people (and events) together. 
As none of this makes it to Beever’s story, we are left puzzled when we read 
that the traditional view declined ‘after the convulsion set off by Hobbes and the 
English Civil War’ (6), especially as Beever himself says that this ‘decline was not 
  
the result of a confrontation between the traditional and the modern view won 
by the latter’, but rather the result of a ‘ “paradigm shift” in the way that people 
thought about politics’ (6). Thomas Kuhn, who coined the term, argued that 
paradigm shifts occur when there is an accumulation of empirical findings that 
cannot not be explained within an existing scientific paradigm.27 Obviously, by 
using Kuhn’s term, Beever is not obliged to accept Kuhn’s analysis of it, but as 
he denies anything like this was the cause of the paradigm shift in this case, he 
needs to supply an alternative explanation. This is no small matter. The 
forgetting thesis is the central thesis of Beever’s book, and if it were true, it 
would count as one of the most dramatic transformations in human 
(intellectual) history. How did we come to forget our interpersonal 
relationships? The two culprits Beever mentions just won’t do: on Beever’s 
account blaming Hobbes, as we have seen, makes no sense; as for the Civil 
War, apart from its supposed influence on Hobbes, it is unclear what, if 
anything, it had to do with the decline of the traditional view. 
As the forgetting thesis is false, we need not trouble ourselves too much with 
this question. The broader historical canvas, however, suggests an alternative 
story that provides part of the explanation of the state of contemporary private 
law. This story is not about forgetting of interpersonal relations, but of 
remembering the world we live in and adapting the law to an environment 
radically different from what it had been three centuries ago. It is true that 
private law changed by taking broader social considerations into account, but 
this happened not because people have forgotten about interpersonal relationships. 
  
It is because, rightly or wrongly, those in charge of the development of private 
law have come to see (sometimes only semi-consciously) that private law 
would function less well than other alternatives in the circumstances of the 
modern world, if it maintained its ‘traditional’ form. In part, change was 
necessary because the environment and society that the law had to deal with 
were very different than before; in part, it was needed because lawmakers 
had more information and better institutional tools available to them that could 
be harnessed for improving the law. And as the pace of these developments – 
social, political, scientific, technological, demographic – has dramatically 
accelerated in recent times, it should not be surprising that ideas or doctrines 
that may have served people reasonably well from Aristotle to Locke, became 
obsolete (or at least in need of updating) within a fairly short time. 
 
 
BEEVER’S THEORETICAL CLAIMS 
 
I have spent considerable space on Beever’s historical thesis, because it is the 
central idea animating his book and it takes up more than two-thirds of it. Those 
sympathetic to Beever’s position could still maintain that one can reject his 
forgetting thesis and ignore his historical narrative and still believe that private 
law is better understood in terms of commutative justice than in terms of 
distributive justice. This is unquestionably true. It is therefore necessary to 
examine the traditional view on its own terms. In this section I will largely ignore 
  
Beever’s historical narrative and examine Beever’s claims regarding the problems 
with the modern understanding of private law. I will argue that Beever does not 
provide any good reason to favour of the traditional view and that he 
fundamentally misunderstands the modern view.28 I have divided the 
discussion into three somewhat overlapping topics: the supposed conceptual 
claim about the nature of private law; the role of private law institutions; and 
Beever’s neglect of the implications of his own traditional view. 
 
The conceptual claim 
 
Behind Beever’s historical narrative, lies what he considers is a conceptual point 
(308): Beever seeks to convince his readers that there are two distinct forms of 
justice, each with its own domain and neither reducible to the other. He seems 
to think that by pointing out that a form of justice ‘exists’ and that it matches a 
certain practice, he has done enough to show that that practice is better 
understood in terms of that form of justice, and that it would be wrong to 
conceive of it differently. For example, he says, ‘[Aristotle’s] claim is . . . that 
corrective justice ought to be done because corrective justice demands it. 
That is what it means for corrective justice to be a form of justice’ (73). The 
context leaves no doubt that Beever shares this view. 
This passage raises an intriguing question that Beever never carefully addresses, 
which touches on the relationship between commutative and distributive justice. 
This may seem like a borderline question that need not affect the ‘internal’ analysis 
  
of the ‘nature’ of commutative justice, but as I hope to show it is central to the 
evaluation of Beever’s position. One possible way of understanding the 
relationship between commutative and distributive justice is that they occupy (to 
borrow a phrase from Stephen Jay Gould) two ‘non-overlapping magisteria’. 
We can classify events in the world as belonging exclusively to commutative 
justice or to distributive justice (and probably some that fit neither), but no 
event raises questions for both. It follows from this view that there can be no 
conflicts between commutative and distributive justice. (There is, I think, some 
reason to think that this is how Aristotle understood the relationship between 
the two, but I will say nothing here to substantiate this claim.) 
In some instances it looks as though Beever believes that this is the correct view. 
For example, it fits his view that limits distributive justice to redistribution (279). 
In a different (and perhaps inconsistent) formulation he says that an act constitutes 
‘distributive injustice only if the reason it is wrongful is that it results in an unfair 
distribution of benefits and burdens amongst the community’ (107–108, also 137, 
cf 145). On this view, it seems, distributive justice is not about the redistribution 
of resources. On this view distributive justice is about what individuals should be 
asked to contribute (burdens) for the sake of certain public goods (benefits). That 
is an inegalitarian conception of distributive justice, which needs to be backed by 
a normative argument, not presented as a conceptual truth.29 
Even if this view is correct, it still has to address the fundamental problem of 
explaining property (and by implication property law) exclusively in terms of 
commutative justice. Beever himself thinks of property as ‘relationship to things’ 
  
(205) which bind the whole world (as opposed to the rights against other people 
in the rest of private law). Beever’s defence of this view amounts to the claim that 
‘the rules [of property law] do not refer to issues of distributive justice and . . . 
they are oblivious to distributive outcomes’ (146). Even if true (and that is, in 
fact, a very contentious claim), this response does not address the problem, which 
is that because property rights impose limits on all others, they cannot be 
grounded only in interpersonal relations, because no human has interpersonal 
relations with all other humans. The charge is that for this reason property 
requires political institutions that create rights that bind everyone (whether or 
not the resulting property regime is ‘oblivious to distributive outcomes’). As 
Beever acknowledges, something like this view can be found even in the works 
of traditionalists Pufendorf and Kant (137, 161). 
A second problem, seemingly more technical but no less significant, is that 
Beever does not hint at what happens to property upon the death of its 
owner, at least when she died intestate. Do rules of inheritance belong to 
commutative or distributive justice? As death does not (necessarily) involve 
a bilateral relationship, it is hard to see how commutative justice could be 
relevant, and it is not part of Beever’s own statement on the scope of 
commutative justice (205). If so, then Beever is wrong to say that 
commutative justice alone suffices for governing property. Even if 
inheritance is somehow included in commutative justice, what does it say 
about it? Does private property return to the commons upon death (in 
which case positive law does not merely enforce commutative justice but 
  
changes it), or does it automatically become the private property of other 
people?30 Does it call for primogeniture?31 Can commutative justice tell us 
how much the spouse should get in relation to the children? Should males 
and females have equal shares? (A negative answer to this question seemed 
as obvious to many of Beever’s traditionalists as an affirmative one was 
obvious to moderns like Bentham or Mill, to say nothing of those who 
came after them.) Is the property held jointly by all successors, or does each 
get an exclusive ownership in a share? If it is the latter, what is the standard 
for division: equal shares per person, or some other measure (eg, the 
amount of love and affection each relevant person had bestowed on the 
deceased)? Who are the relevant persons for shares: is it limited to one’s 
family, or do loving friends get a stake as well, perhaps even prior to 
ungenerous children? As death, alas, has happened a few billions times in the 
course of human history, these questions can hardly be brushed aside as 
quibbles over trifles. 
All this does not bode well for Beever’s overall point, which is that private law 
‘is not about “the way of life of the peoples”’ (205, quoting and rejecting 
Montesquieu). The different answers that can be (and have been) given to the 
questions posed above about inheritance are examples of the role of social values 
in private law. Even within the core of private law that Beever talks about, how 
are we to think of the old rule that women (largely) lost their capacity to enter 
into contracts upon getting married? How are we to think of changes in the way 
property law has treated marital property during their relationship and upon its 
  
dissolution, of what belongs to the ‘things’ that according to Beever property law 
is about (205), or of harms are recognised by tort law? On Beever’s view the only 
way to explain such changes is as the correction of some conceptual error about 
the nature of private law. I think a more natural way to think them of them is 
as reflecting ‘the way of life of the peoples’. How are we to decide between these 
competing explanations? If changes in private law had been the result of 
‘conceptual’ errors and had nothing to do with prevailing social views, we 
would have expected to see no correlation between changes in private law and 
changes in social attitudes. But of course that is precisely what we do not find. 
In all the examples I gave (and in many others I did not) changes in private 
law and in social attitudes have been in tune. 
For such reasons the non-overlapping magisteria view looks like a dead-end, 
and at times Beever himself seems to have a different understanding of the 
relationship between commutative and distributive justice. He acknowledges 
that commutative justice may have political (305) and distributive (166–167) 
consequences. Now, if this is the case and if (as Beever thinks) commutative and 
distributive justice are distinct forms of justice irreducible to the other, then 
necessarily there will be conflicts between them, ie cases in which following 
commutative justice will have effects that make matters distributively worse. 
Beever’s view amounts to the claim that in all such conflicts, we should follow 
commutative justice, but since there is nothing in Beever’s book that directly 
addresses this question, he offers no reason to think that in any (let alone every) 
case of conflict, we should prefer commutative to distributive justice. 
  
Here is another way of making this point: a lawmaking body can fully accept 
Beever’s way of dividing commutative and distributive justice and simply treat 
the kind of events we classify under ‘private law’ exclusively on the basis of 
distributive justice standards. It is plainly not impossible to do so – New 
Zealand’s accident scheme is an example of doing just that. But if ignoring 
commutative justice altogether is conceptually possible, then clearly taking it into 
account alongside other considerations is conceptually possible as well. This may 
be undesirable, but there is no conceptual difficulty with doing so. If Beever is 
troubled that the resulting legal regime is not ‘genuine’ tort law, so be it: we’ll 
call it schmort law; and if such a position is not ‘genuinely liberal’ (292), so be 
it: it can be genuinely schliberal. What matters is if it is overall better, not 
whether it fits a label. 
The picture gets even more complex once it is acknowledged that virtually all 
modern states routinely use what in Beever’s terms are commutative justice 
events for the sake of promoting distributive goals: in many states, most sales 
(commutative justice events) are an occasion for the collection of tax (a 
distributive justice event); the same is true of income for labour, which Beever 
treats as a clear example of commutative justice (279). If such taxation is 
unobjectionable (and Beever says nothing to the contrary), there is no 
principled reason why a negligence case (a commutative justice event) should 
not also be an occasion for distributive justice. There may be normative 
considerations against doing so, but there is nothing in the conceptual 
analysis of private law or of commutative justice that bears on the question 
  
whether courts should do so. For even if we accept such conceptual arguments, 
all they amount to is that such considerations do not ‘belong’ in tort law (which 
‘genuinely’ is exclusively about commutative justice). In response we could just 
say that tort law events require courts to take into account commutative justice 
considerations (as found in tort law, strictly so-called) alongside distributive 
ones. 
 
The institutional argument 
 
All this shows the pointlessness of trying to win normative debates by appeal to 
conceptual analysis. Sensing perhaps the weakness of these conceptual 
arguments, Beever bolsters his normative conclusions with arguments relying on 
the institutional limits of courts and their lack of legitimacy to decide 
political questions. So understood, there is nothing in any event that 
forecloses taking distributive considerations into account, but there are 
constraints on the body that decides such cases, that limit the sort of 
considerations it should rely on. 
Unlike the conceptual arguments, these are valid concerns, but they need to 
be considered carefully. One reason to doubt such arguments is that they prove 
too much. If such arguments were convincing, they would require a significant 
change in the way courts have operated for several decades now in the domain 
of public law. Even if Beever is interested only in private law, it is surprising, to 
say the least, that he does not acknowledge the full scope of his arguments and 
  
the extent to which they would require not just some rethinking in private law, 
but also rolling back decades of public law developments as well. Simply as a 
matter of sheer numbers, if it is institutional capacity and political legitimacy he 
is concerned about, the role courts often play in constitutional litigation should 
have worried him much more.32 
Beever might reply that he is happy (or sad) to report that in his view much 
of public law adjudication is politically illegitimate but that, unlike the lost cause 
that is public law, in private law there may still be hope in returning the law to 
its proper, traditional, origins. But even within the domain of private law, it is 
unclear whether courts could satisfy his strictures. Beever’s argument, a familiar 
point in the work of tort law nostalgics, is that when the court decides an issue 
according to commutative justice ‘it is able to determine how the gap should be 
filled by considering justice as between the parties’, hence ‘its law-making need 
not be political’ (302). Notice first how Beever changes his analysis to fit his 
desired conclusion: earlier in the book Beever designated private law and 
commutative justice to what he called the ‘politico-legal’ domain. By the end of 
the book, in addressing a different question, the boundaries are redrawn so that 
private law is no longer political. In any case, even if private law is by some 
measure completely non-political, Beever’s conclusion does not follow. The 
institutional concerns about judges deciding political matters is not due to the 
fact that there is some category of ‘political’ questions that judges are inherently 
forbidden to consider; the concern is with having them decide questions with 
certain characteristics that make them (according to this line of reasoning) 
  
inappropriate for judges to decide. If decisions in other domains have similar 
characteristics, they are equally problematic, even if they are not ‘political’. (In 
truth, since there is no preordained list of ‘political’ matters, we are likely to 
consider a matter ‘political’ if it has these characteristics.) Questions raise similar 
concerns for institutional capacity and legitimacy when the following three 
conditions obtain: the question relates to matters affecting the life of large 
numbers of members of a community; the answers are controversial among 
members of the public; and there are no deemed experts capable of deciding 
them ‘correctly’. Whether or not classified as ‘political’, questions about the 
scope of liability in private law often meet these criteria. 
Beever concedes that there may be disagreements on questions of private law 
(302) but denies that this fact undermines judges’ capacity to decide them (304). 
But why should such matters be handed to judges even if they may be publicly 
controversial? Beever’s answer is that ‘judges have superior expertise with respect 
to commutative justice’ (306). In other words, he thinks that the last of the three 
characteristics identified above for institutionally problematic decisions does not 
obtain. But judges’ expertise on commutative justice is an empirical claim for 
which he gives no evidence, and it is unclear what would make them such 
experts. It is not as if there is some sort of certification or specialisation that can 
show one to be an expert on commutative justice in the way one can be shown 
to be an expert on the rules of contract law, and to argue that judges’ expertise 
in contract law makes them experts in commutative justice is precisely what 
Beever needs to show. It cannot simply be the fact that because judges are 
  
required to think about commutative justice they have developed expertise on 
the subject, for if that were the case, we could just expose judges to the broader 
range of issues required to make good decisions on distributive justice and thus 
make them experts on political questions. In fact, if constant exposure to a 
question is sufficient for such expertise, arguably contemporary judges could 
claim expertise in distributive justice already since public law litigation constantly 
exposes them to it. Even if it can be shown that judges are experts on 
commutative justice because legal doctrine embodies it, that would just beg the 
question why doctrine should match commutative justice (and not something 
else). Since it is possible to decide such questions on other grounds, if most 
members of a community prefer a different legal rule which they justify on 
(say) distributive justice grounds, why should they not get to enact it? 
Finally, if Beever’s forgetting thesis is correct, we should be sceptical of the 
alleged judicial expertise on questions of commutative justice. After all, it is 
the judges who have been encumbered by politics in the domain of public law 
and who have often blurred the boundaries between the two; it is the judges who 
read those academic articles peddling the modern ideas. The people, by 
contrast, are according to Beever himself, less exposed to such dangerous 
nonsense, and so (either directly or through their elected representatives) 
should be given to decide these matters. 
This shows that even if we accept Beever’s argument wholesale, all that 
follows is that judges should decide cases on commutative justice grounds if we 
wish to have such cases decided on non-political grounds. Society could prefer to have 
  
such cases decided politically and designate it to a non-judicial body that would 
be empowered to decide such cases on distributive grounds. Beever does not 
directly address this question but some remarks he makes reveal his attitude to 
such suggestions. One option is to turn these matters over to the legislature 
which (if functioning properly) avoids both the problem of legitimacy and the 
problem of lack of institutional capacity. Nevertheless, Beever believes that 
when the legislature intervenes in the domain of private law, its role should be 
limited to ‘remov[ing] obstacles to the achievement of commutative justice’ 
(306). This view does not follow from anything Beever has argued for. One may 
accept that there are some pre-political natural law norms; one may even grant 
that some such norms are necessary for establishing a political community so that 
in some sense some law is prior to politics. It does not follow that after the polity’s 
establishment, it should simply try to enforce these pre-political norms to govern 
the interpersonal relationships that exist within a political community. The 
legislature may choose to do that, but it may equally decide to replace them with 
others. To deny this is tantamount to the claim that there are substantive limits 
on the law-making powers not just of courts, but also of legislatures, which go 
beyond anything that may be written in any constitution. (This implies that 
according to Beever himself, courts and legislatures lack political authority in this 
field: 215, cf 178.) But nothing, either in the conceptual ‘nature’ of private law, 
or in the traditional view’s priority of law over politics warrants this conclusion. 
Once we abandon the non-overlapping magisteria view, distributive justice 
considerations do not miraculously lose their validity in the context of a 
  
commutative justice event, and a legislature may enact laws that reflect that. 
Beever strongly disapproves of such ideas. He considers the possibility of 
appointing ‘social policy expert[s]’ (300) to an administrative body that would 
decide such cases on the basis of distributive justice, but finds such a solution 
would be ‘repellent’ and ‘unjust’ (300). But what if these policy experts were to 
give their recommendations that would then be enacted by the legislature, 
leaving judges with politically unproblematic task of applying these rules, where 
is the problem? I speculate that he considers such a solution ‘unjust’ because it 
would not comply with the principles of commutative justice. But, to the extent 
that commutative and distributive justice may conflict, entrusting courts to 
decide such cases on the basis of commutative justice would also be unjust, 
distributively unjust. In such a case, the only question is whether society prefers 
commutative injustice to distributive injustice or vice versa, but on this view, 
either way there will be an injustice. Without further argument there is no reason to 
prefer one sort of injustice over another. 
And why is such a suggestion ‘repellent’? Courts are, on Beever’s view, a kind 
of administrative body staffed by commutative justice experts, so what is the 
problem with appointing experts on distributive justice and enacting their 
recommendations (leaving decisions to judges based on legislative rules 
promoting distributive justice), or even turning the entire matter for distributive 
experts to decide? I believe Beever’s visceral reaction to such a solution tells us 
something about his views on distributive justice, namely that he doubts there is 
any expertise in the domain of distributive justice, that, at least in the sense 
  
used in contemporary political theory, it is just a fancy name for a free-for-all 
fight for a larger share of society’s resources. Administrators placed to decide such 
matters would be ‘repellent’ because they would inevitably impose their own 
preferences and prejudices. As a result, this solution would be a form of tyranny 
with the power to take property from some and give it to others. By contrast, I 
suspect Beever believes commutative justice is a product of Reason, a domain 
on which one can have a rational debate. I cannot be sure that this is Beever’s 
view, but much of what he says fits it, as does what he does not say: there 
is no real discussion in the book of what Beever thinks the proper domain of 
distributive justice is, and more importantly, there is no attempt to articulate, 
even in general outline, some way of resolving conflicts between distributive 
and commutative justice. 
The practical effect of Beever’s view is that certain events will be decided on 
the basis of commutative justice alone. Beever seems to think that this follows 
from the fact that courts are institutionally-constrained, but in fact in such cases 
we face a choice. If we are convinced that certain events raise both commutative 
and distributive justice considerations (which seems to be Beever’s view) and that 
judges are institutionally incapable of deciding such matters taking into account 
all the relevant considerations, then the institutional question is this: should we 
leave the decision to a body that is not going to take all relevant considerations 
into account (thus more-or-less guaranteeing its decisions will be all-things- 
considered wrong), or should we remove the decision from that body and giving 
it to a different one that can take all considerations into account. There is no 
  
obvious answer to this question, for the benefits from awarding the decision to 
bodies that decide on narrower grounds (simplicity, fewer controversies) may 
outweigh the benefits from deciding based on all the relevant considerations. But 
such a question, if taken seriously, requires careful consideration. The view that 
it would always be better to give decision-making power on such matters to the 
more institutionally-constrained body without any argument seems motivated 
by different concerns, political ones. As I will argue below, Beever’s book reveals 
his political preferences, and the priority he gives to commutative justice in cases 
of conflict matches those preferences. 
 
The missing alternative 
 
So far this section ignored history, but it is worth returning to the broader 
historical picture presented earlier for an alternative understanding of 
commutative justice. On this alternative view commutative justice is not a 
distinct form of justice but a distinct form of regulation. Its two most important 
distinguishing characteristics are after-the-fact response to claims brought about by 
individuals. (This is easiest to understand with regard to tort law, but it is true of 
other branches of private law as well.) These features are the main reason 
why this form of regulation was until fairly recently (by and large) the only 
form of regulation available, why, in other words, it seems to correspond to a 
‘traditional’ view of the law: it is typically the simplest form of regulation. Once 
technology opened up new possibilities, it became possible to think of new ways 
  
of regulating many of the events previously regulated by commutative justice. 
I offer the characterisation of commutative justice as a form of regulation as a 
competing understanding to Beever’s. The question now is which of these two 
interpretive possibilities better explains and illuminates our practices. Though 
plainly this is not a matter that can be explored here in any detail, I believe the 
historical evidence briefly sketched earlier supports the view that regards what is 
known as ‘commutative justice’ as a form of regulation. Many puzzles about 
commutative justice and its relationship with distributive justice are resolved 
once we understand it in this way. 
Beever’s ignoring this possibility may explain why he says nothing about 
another regulatory possibility, one that he should have found particularly 
attractive, a more ‘genuinely’ private version of private law than the one he 
discusses. People can make agreements and rely exclusively on their sense of 
the binding force of promises (or whatever) as the reason to abide by them; 
people can accept a pre-political obligation to repair harms (or wrongs) they 
cause others by making amends in the form of monetary compensation, 
public apologies, or in any other form. So long as the state does not interfere 
with such actions, this form of ‘private law’ would be a much better example of 
commutative justice (in its purely interpersonal, bilateral sense) than the one 
governed by state institutions. (Admittedly, part of the reason why people fulfil 
their contractual obligations or agree to pay compensation in such cases may 
have to do with their concern for their reputation in the eyes of third parties. 
Still, the state would not be involved.) If Beever is concerned for the 
  
preservation of interpersonal relations, he should have argued for this, at least as 
an ideal to aspire to. After all, even if state courts strictly limit themselves to 
commutative justice and to enforcing people’s pre-political rights, in playing 
an active role in enforcing such rights they may plant in people’s minds what 
Beever considers the bane of our modern existence, the tendency to 
‘overemphasize the importance of the state and overestimate its ability to 
facilitate justice’ (309). In other words, if Beever really is troubled by the state 
and the dangerous role it has come to play in our lives, if he really is 
concerned for our interpersonal freedoms being crushed by the state, it is 
odd that he never considers the removal of the state from private law. This is no 
mere libertarian utopianism: There are some writers who have written 
admiringly on examples of this more private form of regulation.33 
To those less troubled by the presence of the state in their lives, such studies, 
though valuable, highlight (perhaps inadvertently) the limits of this form of 
regulation: First, they typically work only among fairly close-knit or small groups 
where informal mechanisms for enforcing compliance can function well. 
Whenever these conditions are not in place, one inevitably finds complex 
institutional mechanisms that supplement (rather than merely enforce) pre-
political private law.34 Online markets function as well as they do because of 
sophisticated trading platforms (provided by a third party that sets up the rules 
and as such fulfils a similar role to the state) that can facilitate the trust that 
would otherwise be difficult to maintain among strangers. Second, such forms 
of ‘opting out’ piggyback on the state. The historical evidence mentioned earlier, 
  
as well as contemporary data on countries with weak political institutions, 
strongly suggest that peaceful mechanisms that allow neighbours to settle their 
disputes without law, are easier to sustain when a state with well-functioning 
institutions exists in the background. 
Recognition of the conceptual possibility of a form of regulation more 
private than the one Beever discusses also makes it easier to understand why, 
when the state is involved, there is no basis for limiting a priori the kind of 
considerations it can bring to bear in adjudication. Those who manage their 
affairs on their own can decide on whatever rules fit their fancy; when the state 
is involved by providing a set of enforceable rules (ie, when the state mobilises 
its power to guarantee others’ compliance), it provides a service needed precisely 
by those who worry that the truly private form of private law would not 
suffice. Two points follow: first, there is nothing odd about the idea that on this 
view ‘contract law is seen as an imposition on freedom rather than the realisation 
thereof’ (270), for that is precisely what contract law is for: it is an 
institution that brings in a third party – the state – to compel (or guarantee or 
signal) compliance.35 As such, contract law can be seen as an imposition on 
freedom for the sake of the (greater) freedom made possible by contracting. 
Second, and more important, because positive private law is a state-provided 
service, the state is entitled to provide it on its own terms, which may include 
(amongst other things) taking societal or distributive considerations into 
account. That is exactly what the state does when, as a matter of unquestionable 
legal doctrine, it refuses to provide its assistance to the enforcement of certain 
  
contracts that are unimpeachable from a purely commutative perspective. 
Those unhappy with this service, can (and do) resort to other, more 
private means of enforcement: Knowing that the state will not provide its 
enforcement-services for his agreements is why the contract killer relies on other 
means for making sure he is paid. 
 
BEEVER’S POLITICS 
 
Beever’s arguments fail as an attempt at ‘understanding’ the law and politics of 
our times, because he ignores almost everything that is relevant for understanding 
them. What he is unhappy about is not the prevalence of an ‘idea’ (2), it is the 
reality built on the foundations of this idea. If we are to make sense of the book, 
it is not as an attempt at understanding, but as a work of political advocacy. This 
seems to be a latent theme in the book (eg, 104) mostly hidden under a veneer 
of conceptual analysis. It is only in the final pages of the book, as though Beever 
could no longer contain himself, that his politics become explicit. Beever 
suggests that the modern view leads to totalitarianism (289–291). To 
demonstrate just how far we have already gone down that road, in an essay 
published shortly before Forgotten Justice and which can be read as a précis for it, 
Beever has noted that ours is the age of ‘human resources’ as proof of the 
manner in which the modern view has made us treat our fellow humans.36 In 
that essay Beever candidly said he hoped his ideas would be ‘politically 
transformative’37 and for that end in Forgotten Justice he quotes from Joseph 
  
Goebbels and from Che Guevara (290–291, 308–309) as warning signs for 
where we are headed, the impending eradication of the individual under 
the crushing yoke of an allconsuming state.38 It is not just the future, 
though: already ‘our forgetting of commutative justice’ has ‘led us to ignore 
the importance of interpersonal freedom, to overplay the needs of the 
community vis-à-vis the autonomy of the individual, and to overemphasize the 
importance of the state and overestimate its ability to facilitate justice’ (309). In the 
same vein, in the earlier essay Beever also said that ‘[h]uman rights law is the 
ambulance at the bottom of the cliff. We need it in part because the fence at the 
top, constructed in no small part by the private law, has been torn down. But it 
is worse than this, as that law now encourages people to fall down’.39 
Though Beever seeks to present these concerns as ones shared by many on the 
left and the right (309), Beever’s politics are difficult to mistake – the desire to 
protect the individual from the overpowering collective; the belief that the 
foundations of political community are based on natural law; the view that 
private law should largely reflect those natural laws; the view that respect 
for ‘traditional’ private law is necessary (and perhaps sufficient) for a 
wellfunctioning society; the narrow and inegalitarian understanding of 
distributive justice; the concern that modern private law has been infiltrated by 
‘alien’ public concerns, which in turn is but one manifestation of a more 
general encroachment of our freedoms by the state; the claim that people tend to 
over-rely on the state; the insinuation that seemingly innocuous Western 
welfare states already take us down the road to serfdom; even an opposition 
  
to the idea that people have any moral duty to rescue strangers40 – these are 
all familiar libertarian themes.41 
Beever is entitled to his political opinions, but it would take a very different 
book from the one he has written to try to persuade those who do not share 
his views to adopt them. Since Beever does not argue for these views, I will 
not discuss here the merits or demerits of libertarianism. Absent a political 
argument, one would have expected at least some empirical evidence to support 
his prophecies of imminent doom. There are lots of sheep in New Zealand, 
but not, to my knowledge, any evidence that New Zealanders have become 
more sheep-like in their blind adherence to government or that they have 
forgotten their interpersonal relationships since they adopted their social 
accident compensation scheme. The US provides another example. Beever 
mentions it as a country where the distinction between public law and 
private law is not dominant (170), and with private law more politicised than 
elsewhere (251).42 On his analysis that must mean that the US is further down 
the totalitarian road than the rest of the common law world. There is, as far as 
I can tell, no evidence to support that. 
The most comprehensive challenge to Beever’s claims comes from the 
statistics mentioned earlier on the decline in human violence in exactly those 
times and places in which the state has been an active presence, a decline made 
all the more remarkable by the fact that population density is much higher now 
than in the past. The data themselves are overwhelming and difficult to 
dispute, but unless shown to be wrong, Beever would have to challenge the 
  
causal connection between the rise of the state and the decline of 
interpersonal violence. Doing so would present Beever with a dilemma: if 
the decline in violence can be attributed, even in part, to the state, then he 
is wrong to say that people ‘overemphasize the state and overestimate its 
ability to facilitate justice’ (309); quite the contrary, most people, perhaps 
because they are unfamiliar with the alternative, do not appreciate just how 
much the state is responsible for their peaceful lives. If on the other hand this 
decline has nothing to do with the state, then the most likely explanation is a 
major improvement in humans’ concern for interpersonal relationships, which 
would suggest his worries are unfounded. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is sometimes useful to take a step back from a theory, not just to point out its 
logical inconsistencies, hidden assumptions, or unwarranted conclusions, but in 
order to consider its overall message. Sometimes this more panoramic view can 
reveal what closer inspection misses out. When one does that, one of the striking 
features of Beever’s position is just how strange it is. This is perhaps clearest in 
the position he takes towards the place of consequences. In contemporary moral 
philosophy a view is usually classified as non-consequentialist when its 
proponents think that consequences are not the only thing that matters, that 
sometimes other, ‘deontological’, considerations (sometimes called side-
constraints) override concern for consequences. What is remarkable about 
  
Beever’s approach (along with that of other private law nostalgics) is that he 
thinks that in the domain of private law consequences never matter, that 
it is never right for humans to choose certain rules over others because they 
will improve their lot. Contrary to Beever’s claim that this is the ‘traditional’ view 
that all philosophers used to accept and that this is the view that most people 
intuitively accept, this extreme view has very few adherents.43 
Note again that even if one accepts that the foundations of political authority 
must be grounded in certain non-consequentialist moral considerations that just 
‘exist’, that more concretely, the social contract is binding because of 
prepolitical, purely interpersonal norms, it in no way follows that contract 
law should simply imitate those norms. Nor does it follow that society may 
not choose other rules for its positive contract law, if it believes such rules could 
lead to better consequences. To think otherwise is to adopt a theological view of 
law, according to which True Private Law descends on us from heaven and 
what we need to do is ‘discover . . . and develop . . .’ (284) what it demands of us 
through conceptual or doctrinal analysis, and then follow. If doing so leads 
to consequences we find undesirable, well, dura lex, sed lex. This attitude is 
reflected in Beever’s discussion of a wrongful life claim of a child born with 
‘catastrophic disabilities’ (283). Beever argues that such a claim should be 
dismissed for the sole reason that ‘she had no right not to have been born’ 
(284). There is no recognition that there may be valid considerations in favour 
of imposing liability (better treatment in the future, concern for the plight of 
the family involved, preference for the innocent over the negligent, and, yes, 
  
also distributive justice) that are utterly ignored by the facile assertion regarding 
her rights. By relying on concepts developed when the technology that makes 
such claims possible did not exist, Beever ignores all these considerations. 
The practical effect of this view is that humans cannot change the law to fit 
their interests and changing environment, because, apparently, it is stronger than 
them. The only way to make sense of Beever’s view is if he thinks that what 
(he thinks) commutative justice demands is the right decision, that all-things 
considered people in this child’s situation, should not be compensated and 
that society would behave immorally towards someone if it forced him to pay 
damages in such a case. If this is so, then in presenting his arguments as 
‘conceptual’, Beever tries to win a normative argument without bothering with 
a normative argument. If, as Beever says, commutative justice is a form of justice, 
it remains an open question whether we should try to have laws conforming to 
that form. Put differently, even if private law, properly understood, embodies the 
principles of commutative justice, it remains an open question whether we 
should have private law. These are the real, political, questions at stake between 
traditionalists and modernists. Forgotten Justice offers no assistance in answering 
them. 
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